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On the Distinctive Procedural Wrong of Colonialism

 
Laura Valentini 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Biographical Note: Laura Valentini is Associate Professor of Political Science at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. Among her research interests are 
international justice, ideal and non-ideal theory, human rights, political authority, and 
democratic theory. 
 
Introduction 
Colonialism is associated with many all-too-familiar wrongs: oppression, 
exploitation, murder, racism, and dehumanization, among others. On one view, the 
wrong of colonialism is exhausted by the “sum” of these familiar wrongs—wrongs 
that are not necessarily tied to colonialism, and that may also occur in non-colonial 
settings. Lea Ypi has recently argued for a different view, according to which there is 
more to the wrong of colonialism. For Ypi, the colonial takeover and subjugation of 
political collectives are wrong as such, over and above the familiar wrongs 
contingently associated which such takeovers.
1
 Specifically, Ypi argues that 
colonialism always instantiates a distinctive kind of procedural wrong, one that rests 
on the unequal structure of the political decision procedures characterizing colonial 
settings, rather than on their outcomes.
2
  
Ypi’s view is elegant, parsimonious and intuitively appealing. But upon 
scrutiny, it turns out to be unsustainable. Seeing why this is so is instructive, and 
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 2 
sheds light on the nature of the wrong of colonialism. My argument proceeds as 
follows. In Section I, I present Ypi’s account of the distinctive procedural wrong of 
colonialism, and note that it is susceptible to two interpretations: an “aggregate” and a 
“corporate” one. In Sections II and III, I explain why neither interpretation is 
convincing. The aggregate interpretation over-reaches: it leads us to condemn as 
wrongful a range of practices that are instead justified. The corporate interpretation 
problematically presupposes that collective entities are fundamental units of moral 
concern, contrary to normative individualism. The difficulties with Ypi’s view prompt 
me to suggest, in Section IV, that either there is no distinctive procedural wrong 
attached to the unilateral takeover of political collectives or, if there is, this wrong 
was unlikely to be instantiated in many real-world cases of colonization. I thus 
conclude that, although colonialism was wrong for countless reasons, there is no 
distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. 
 
I. Ypi’s account of the wrong of colonialism 
What is colonialism? Ypi understands it as a “practice that involves collective 
political agents,” whereby some such agents (the colonizers) subjugate others (the 
colonized) and exercise “political and economic control” over them. 3  For Ypi, 
colonialism so understood is always wrong—indeed, she asks her readers to grant as 
much.
4
 However, her diagnosis of the wrong of colonialism seeks to eschew appeal to 
violations of territorial rights, violations of national or cultural self-determination, and 
the brutality and violence that often go hand-in-hand with colonization.
5
 To be sure, 
                                                 
3
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 3 
she readily concedes that forcibly relocating people, “[b]urning native settlements, 
torturing innocents, slaughtering children, enslaving entire populations, [and] 
exploiting the soil and natural resources available to them” are morally deplorable 
practices contingently associated with colonialism.
6
 In other words, she acknowledges 
that colonial government involved the perpetration of serious substantive injustice. 
But for Ypi, there is something wrong with colonialism as such, over and above its 
likely dire consequences for colonized populations.
7
  
 As she puts it, “[c]olonialism is a distinctive wrong.”8 Yet it is “a distinctive 
wrong within a larger family of wrongs, the wrong exhibited by associations that deny 
their members equality and reciprocity in decision making.”9 In the colonial case 
specifically, this denial of equality and reciprocity is crystallized in the unilateral 
subjection of the colonized collective to the will of the colonizing one. In Ypi’s view, 
it is the procedural unilateralism of colonialism that explains its inherently wrongful 
nature. And since this unilateralism is constitutive of colonialism, for Ypi, 
colonialism is non-contingently procedurally wrong, and distinctively so.  
The procedural unilateralism of colonialism, Ypi further argues, may be 
instantiated in two loci: in the formation of a new, colonial political association, and 
in the internal structure of that association.
10
 Each such instantiation of unilateralism, 
she suggests, is sufficient to make a political relation procedurally wrongful in the 
way colonialism is. To see Ypi’s point, consider the following two scenarios, which 
illustrate, respectively, the wrong of colonial acquisition of political control and the 
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 4 
wrong of colonial structure of political control. 
Imagine that Sweden unilaterally—but peacefully—takes over Canada, and 
starts to govern Canada reasonably justly.
11
 From the perspective of individual rights, 
the people of Canada cannot complain: their civil liberties are protected, they can all 
easily access social services, and everyone continues to have equal entitlements to 
participate in decision-making within the newly established political association. Yet 
the Swedish takeover of Canada appears morally problematic in at least one respect. 
Why? Because it involves the subjection of the will of some to that of others. By 
hypothesis, the takeover is not negotiated with the Canadian people or their 
representatives, and does not enjoy their consent. It thus exhibits the distinctive 
procedural wrong of “colonial acquisition” of political control.  
Second, consider a slave who has voluntarily consented to being under the 
power of his master, and who is made no worse off by virtue of having done so (i.e., 
the master is fully benevolent and protective of the slave). In this case, the formation 
of the master-slave relationship involves no procedural unilateralism, and its 
consequences are not detrimental to the slave. Yet many will still find the structure of 
this master-slave relationship objectionable. The slave is subject to the will of the 
master, who has control over him; he is not an equal decision-maker; decisions lie, 
ultimately, with the master. The wrong inherent in the structure of colonial 
relationships is, for Ypi, a version of the structural wrong of slavery, albeit one that 
distinctively involves political collectives as opposed to individuals. Those who find 
the master-slave relationship I have described objectionable will thus feel the force of 
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Ypi’s account. 
 Ypi’s account is parsimonious and benefits from much intuitive appeal. In 
fact, it may seem so obviously correct that an uncharitably disposed reader might 
even find it trivial. “Of course,” that reader might say, “the wrong of subjecting a 
political collective lies in the inequalities of power and status involved in that 
subjection.” But the appearance that this is obviously correct is misleading. Much of it 
rests on an ambiguity in the notion of “political collective” that Ypi appeals to. 
Specifically, the notion of a collective may be spelt out in either aggregate or 
corporate terms.
12
 In the former case, a collective is just a set of individuals. In the 
latter case, a collective is an agent in its own right.  
For instance, consider a paradigmatic political collective, such as a state—call 
it “state X.” From an aggregate perspective, the expression “state X” is shorthand for 
“the group of individuals who are members of X.”13 By contrast, from a corporate 
perspective, “state X” is an agent in its own right—a collective agent—with its own 
beliefs, desires, and will.
14
 This is the perspective we implicitly adopt when we claim 
that states “sign treaties,” “declare wars,” “send foreign aid,” and so forth.  
Depending on what is meant by a “political collective,” the (alleged) 
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distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism will consist in either the subjection of 
individual members of colonized collectives to alien powers or the subjection of the 
collective itself. In her discussion, Ypi slides between aggregate and corporate 
understandings of a political collective.
15
 But
 
once her account is disambiguated, it 
becomes apparent that no version of it—whether aggregate or corporate—is 
convincing. 
 
II. The aggregate interpretation 
On the first interpretation of Ypi’s account, colonialism is distinctively procedurally 
wrong insofar as it involves the subjection of the wills of individual members of 
colonized groups to colonizers’ control. This occurs whenever terms of political 
association (i.e., laws) are imposed upon them without their voluntary consent. In 
Ypi’s words, for an “associative offer”—namely, an offer to create a new political 
union, characterized by particular terms of association—“to be considered effectively 
equal and reciprocal, the [voluntary] consent of those on the receiving end is 
required.” 16  When such voluntary consent is absent—as in the earlier scenario 
involving Sweden and Canada—a political association exhibits the procedural wrong 
typical of colonialism.  
On this interpretation, the wrong is explained by the following principle: 
 
It is wrong to acquire/exercise control over individual members of a political 
                                                 
15
 For the former, see, e.g., the following passage: “the wrong of colonialism consists in the 
establishment of a form of association that fails to offer equal and reciprocal terms of interaction to all 
its members.” Ypi, “What’s Wrong with Colonialism,” p. 178, added emphasis. For the latter, see, e.g.: 
“colonialism is a practice that involves collective political agents, not individuals,” and another passage 
quoted later in the paper. Ibid., pp. 162, 176.
 
16 
Ibid., p. 179. 
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collective without their voluntary consent.  
 
This principle is substantively implausible: it implies too much. To see this, consider 
the following scenario. A wrongful attacker, A, is harming an innocent victim, B. A 
policeman, C, arrives at the scene and issues the following coercive command 
directed at A: “Stop harming B, otherwise I shall arrest you!” A has not consented to 
the form of control that C—or the government on whose behalf C is acting—exercises 
over him, and yet C’s actions are far from wrongful. Coercion in the service of 
protecting others’ rights is surely morally permissible. So interpreted, then, the non-
contingent procedural account of the wrong of colonialism classifies as wrongful 
some instances of control that are not wrongful at all.  
 It might be objected that this example misfires, since Ypi is not interested in 
the permissibility of one-off unilateral coercion, but rather in the wrongness of 
imposing ongoing terms of association without subjects’ consent.17 It is not clear, 
though, why this should make a difference. Consider this revised version of the above 
scenario.  
Suppose we know that wrongful attacker A would consent only to terms of 
association that gave him full license to do whatever he wishes—drive at whichever 
speed he wants, appropriate whatever resources he wants, injure whomever he wants, 
and so forth. Unfortunately for A—and fortunately for everyone else—the terms of 
association of his polity are fair and give him no such license. Every time A breaches 
the speed limit, steals others’ property or tries to attack innocent individuals, police 
intervenes to enforce laws to which A has not consented. Here too, it would seem 
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 8 
incorrect to criticize the police’s intervention as wrongful because A has not 
consented to the terms of association imposed on him.
18
  
What is more, even if one conceded—implausibly, in my view—that lack of 
consent makes the imposition of ongoing terms of association wrongful, this claim 
could not be used as an explanation of what is distinctively procedurally wrong with 
colonialism. If the lack of individual voluntary consent is what does the explanatory 
work, then what is wrong with, say, the Spanish colonization of the Americas or the 
Dutch colonization of South Africa is equally wrong with the present government of 
Spain, and the present government of the Netherlands (as well as the governments of 
Iceland, Sweden, Norway, and so forth). Why? Because most citizens of these 
countries have not voluntarily consented—whether explicitly or tacitly—to the 
control that their governments exercise over them.
19
 They may passively accept such 
control, but consent is a rare occurrence—for instance, in cases where individuals 
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19
 A. John Simmons, “Tacit Consent and Political Obligation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1976): 
274–91, esp. p. 290. 
 9 
voluntarily take up a new citizenship. 
 Ypi is not unaware of these difficulties. Her response to them attempts to 
establish morally significant differences between the forms of control exercised by 
“regular” domestic governments and those practiced by colonial ones. The relevant 
passage is worth quoting at length. 
 
In the colonial case, colonizers impose their will over the colonized, and the rules of 
association endorsed by the latter reflect the power of the former. In most cases of domestic 
subjection to political authority, we think of all citizens as equal in their subjection to the 
laws, but also equal in their capacity to change the content of such laws. […] Of course, […] 
many domestic political associations have been wrongfully imposed on some groups of 
citizens by other more powerful groups. When that is the case, and if the asymmetry in the 
creation of norms continues to affect the lives of subsequent generations of historically 
wronged groups, we can condemn that association as wrongful for the same reasons we 
condemn colonialism as wrongful. If, with the passage of time, the position of the historically 
wronged group changes such that the subsequent substantive principles of political association 
genuinely track its will and the effects of path dependence disappear, we can say that injustice 
has been superseded. 
I have argued that for an associative offer to be considered effectively equal and 
reciprocal, the [voluntary] consent of those on the receiving end is required….
20
  
  
The passage offers a number of criteria—distinct from voluntary consent—
determining when control does not exhibit the procedural wrong of colonialism. 
(Consent is mentioned again only in the final sentence.) These are: 
 
1. The members’ equal subjection to the law, and equal capacity to change it. 
                                                 
20
 Ypi, “What’s Wrong with Colonialism,” p. 180, emphases added. See also Ypi’s reference to 
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2. The laws’ lack of negative impact on “the lives of subsequent generations of 
historically wronged groups.”  
3. The laws’ “tracking the will” of historically wronged groups.  
 
Given Ypi’s appeal to so many different considerations—and her lack of explicit 
discussion of how they relate to each other—it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what, 
in her view, explains the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. As it turns out, 
however, we need not choose between criteria (1), (2) and (3). As I illustrate in what 
follows, like the lack of voluntary consent, none of them offers a satisfactory account 
of the procedural wrong of colonialism. 
Regarding (1), the condition of equal subjection to the law is consistent with 
the content of the law being highly discriminatory in ways that violate Ypi’s ideal of 
equality and reciprocity in decision-making.
21
 Think of a society in which women 
lack the right to vote. There, every citizen is equally subjected to the law, yet the law 
treats male and female citizens very differently. Analogously, think of a law that 
explicitly gives colonizers the right to exploit the colonized. Here, colonizers and 
colonized are subjected to the same law, they are just treated very differently by it. 
Appeal to the condition of equal subjection, therefore, problematically under-ascribes 
colonial wrongdoing.  
Reliance on “equal capacity to change the law,” by contrast, leads to an over-
ascription of colonial wrongdoing, since there seems to be no real-world political 
community—even among well-functioning democratic ones—in which citizens have 
this capacity to an equal degree. For example, the U.S. President’s capacity to change 
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the law is much greater than that of any ordinary U.S. citizen.
22
 If an equal capacity to 
change the law is needed for a political relationship to be not procedurally wrongful 
in the way colonialism is, then all existing, well-ordered democratic states count as 
wrongfully colonial—which again appears implausible.23  
 Ypi’s first criterion might be interpreted differently, however. Perhaps, what 
she is alluding to is citizens’ formal equality under the law—including their equal 
formal right to participate in political decision-making. The trouble with this 
interpretation is that the lack of formal equality under the law is ill-suited to explain 
the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. Recall the earlier example involving 
a hypothetical Swedish takeover of Canada: this resulted precisely in a political union 
guaranteeing formal equality under the law to all its members (in fact, more than 
that). Yet, on Ypi’s own account, it represented an instantiation of the distinctive 
                                                 
22
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procedural wrong of colonialism.
24
 To be sure, colonial governments were wrongful, 
among other things, because they failed to give their members equal legal status. But 
the distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism, as Ypi understands it, cannot be 
satisfactorily explained solely by a lack of formal legal equality among individuals.  
 Regarding (2), “lack of negative impact” has a substantive as opposed to 
procedural flavour, and is thus in tension with Ypi’s official, purely proceduralist 
account of the wrong of colonialism. I thus set this criterion aside as inconsistent with 
the predominant spirit of her view.  
Turning to (3), this focuses on control tracking the will of relevant agents, as 
opposed to enjoying their voluntary consent. Importantly, tracking an agent’s will 
differs from enjoying their voluntary consent; consent is only one way in which a 
person’s will can be tracked. For example, a benevolent master may excel at tracking 
the will of his slave, guessing what he intends to do, and allowing him to act 
accordingly. Yet, even in this case, we might find the master-slave relationship 
objectionable because the slave is ultimately dependent on the will of the master—
indeed, recall the earlier example of the wrong of colonial structure of political 
control, involving a benign master-slave relation.
25
 “Tracking the will” is thus a less 
stringent criterion than voluntary consent, and it is not obvious whether Ypi would 
genuinely want to endorse it, given her characterization of the wrong of colonialism.
26
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 In fact, for Ypi, the unilateral takeover would have been procedurally wrong even if, instead of a 
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Colonialism,” p. 185.  
25
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26
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 13 
What is more, there is no government, at least in our pluralistic world, whose 
laws and policies always track the will of every single member. It is sufficient to 
consider existing well-constituted democracies, where majorities routinely outvote 
minorities. If tracking individuals’ wills is necessary for avoiding “colonial 
wrongdoing,” then all existing well-ordered democratic states exhibit the distinctive 
procedural wrong of colonialism, because their decisions do not enjoy the people’s 
unanimous support—a conclusion that again implausibly over-reaches.  
To be sure, people’s disagreement about laws and policies may be regrettable; 
and the world would perhaps be a happier place in the absence of such disagreement. 
Furthermore—where feasible—it may be good, perhaps even obligatory, to draw 
political boundaries such that the terms of each political association are as consonant 
as possible with members’ preferences. 27  Consider the referendum on Scottish 
independence, which took place in September 2014. It could be said that, had the 
U.K. government not allowed the Scottish to decide whether to become an 
independent political community—in light of their shared culture and political 
preferences—a particular kind of wrong would have occurred; perhaps, even a 
distinctively “colonial” wrong.  
This may well be true, but it is not what I dispute. What I take issue with is the 
idea that tracking the will of every single subject is necessary for a government to 
avoid “colonial” wrongdoing. This condition fails to be met in the U.K. today, despite 
the referendum. And it would have failed to be met even if the referendum had 
resulted in Scottish independence—contrary to what actually happened. The laws of 
an independent Scotland would predictably not have tracked the will of all Scottish 
people; equally, the laws of the “rest of the U.K.” would not have tracked the will of 
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all remaining subjects. The suggestion that, for this reason, Scotland, the “rest of the 
U.K.,” and any democratic society—even the best run one—would exhibit the 
procedural wrong typical of colonial domination is hard to take seriously. 
 It might be objected that, contrary to what the previous paragraphs assume, in 
order to track its members’ wills, a polity’s laws need not align with everyone’s 
personal judgements or preferences. Instead, political control tracks subjects’ wills to 
the extent that subjects endorse their political membership, and value the process of 
making decisions together—even if the outcomes of those decisions are sometimes at 
odds with their wishes and convictions.
28
  
This alternative interpretation of “will-tracking” also leads to an over-
ascription of wrongdoing. Consider a group of Swedish anarchists who do not endorse 
their membership in the collective Sweden. On the proposed account of “will-
tracking,” the presence of this anarchist group would suffice for Sweden to exhibit the 
procedural wrong of colonialism. More generally, the presence of politically apathetic 
and disaffected citizens in any state—no matter how well-ordered—would be enough 
to trigger concerns about wrongdoing: in fact, about the same kind of wrongdoing that 
characterizes colonial settings. I find this implausible.
29
 
Again, it may be regrettable that some political communities exercise control 
over individuals who, despite having reason to value their membership (say because 
                                                 
28
 I am grateful to an anonymous reader for suggesting this point. A sophisticated version of this view 
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that even if there is an obligation to participate in a fair (i.e., “equal and reciprocal”) political 
association, the imposition of its fair terms on those who do not endorse them is wrongful. Ypi, 
“What’s Wrong with Colonialism,” p. 179. 
 15 
their polity is just), do not. Yet this does not appear sufficient to render that exercise 
of control wrongful in general—recall the “police” example—let alone procedurally 
wrongful in the way colonialism is.  
On inspection, though, this is probably not a conclusion Ypi is committed to. 
Towards the end of the above-quoted passage, she explicitly refers to the “will of a 
group,” as opposed to that of individual members. If tracking the “will of the 
subjected group”—voluntary consent being the best, but not the only, way to do so—
is what makes political control non-unilateral, we need to turn to the corporate 
interpretation of Ypi’s account.  
 
III. The corporate interpretation 
On this interpretation, a group is to be understood as a collective agent, with beliefs, 
desires, and a will of its own. What explains the distinctive wrong of colonialism is a 
failure, on the part of colonisers, to track the collective’s will—e.g., by not acquiring 
its voluntary consent. But what kinds of collective political agents possess moral 
standing such that a failure to track their wills amounts to wrongdoing? Ypi does not 
give much guidance in this respect. She “assumes that we know what makes [a] 
collective a political collective, and that indigenous societies or tribal groups do count 
as political collectives.”30  
Since she does not set out explicit criteria that political collectives must meet 
in order to acquire moral standing, the most straightforward corporate interpretation 
of her account relies on the following principle: 
 
It is wrong to acquire/exercise control over a political collective without 
                                                 
30
 Ypi, “What’s Wrong with Colonialism,” p. 162. 
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tracking its will (e.g., without its voluntary consent).  
 
This principle is inconsistent with individual human beings’ status as equal and 
ultimate units of moral concern. From a normative individualist perspective, the moral 
standing of a collective is explained by, and therefore conditional on, the collective’s 
serving the legitimate interests of individuals. In turn, individual interests are 
legitimate only if they are consistent with reasonable demands of justice—namely 
with the principles that determine the distribution of “the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation,” and establish the rights and duties of fellow members of 
society.
31
 To illustrate, I might have a subjective interest in stealing others’ justly 
acquired possessions, and in preventing them from supporting political parties other 
than my preferred one, yet this interest is illegitimate, since it is at odds with others’ 
rights to property and political participation. 
Once the moral standing of collectives is explained in normative individualist 
terms, the above-stated principle turns out to be implausible. For example, it commits 
us to the view that the exercise of control over a tyrannical—and therefore 
paradigmatically unjust—state requires that state’s voluntary consent in order not to 
be procedurally wrongful. But this cannot possibly be consistent with normative 
individualism. We can easily imagine a tyrannical state strongly opposing the 
unilateral acquisition of control by another state, yet its subjects favoring it, since it 
would be likely to improve their living conditions.
32
 In such a case, from a normative 
                                                 
31
 This is famously Rawls’s characterization of the function of principles of justice. John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4. 
32
 One could object that a “tyrannical state” does not count as a political collective. This would be 
equal to adopting a normativized conception of collective agency, for which there is little theoretical 
warrant. For example, the dictatorial state of North Korea can be plausibly described as a collective 
agent, despite its morally repugnant policies. In other words, we should retain a distinction between 
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individualist perspective, there would appear to be nothing procedurally wrong with 
the takeover—certainly not because of its being contrary to the will of the tyrannical 
state, or because of its undermining of a political association that its corrupt officials 
endorse.
33
 Those officials clearly do not have a legitimate interest in the continued 
existence of the state. Explaining the procedural wrongness of taking over a tyrannical 
collective thus requires attributing standing to the collective independently of how this 
serves the legitimate interests of individuals, contrary to normative individualism. 
In response, it might be suggested that a collective political agent has moral 
standing only as long as it upholds equality and reciprocity among its members: the 
political ideal central to Ypi’s discussion. On this account, the procedural wrong of 
colonialism is explained by the following principle: 
 
It is wrong to acquire/exercise control over a political collective without 
tracking its will (e.g., without its voluntary consent), if and only if the 
collective in question is “equal and reciprocal.”  
 
But in virtue of what does a collective count as “equal and reciprocal”? One 
possibility, consistent with our discussion in the previous section, is to invoke the 
consent—or the tracking of the will—of all members. This option predictably runs 
into difficulties. Since no realistic political collective tracks every member’s will, it 
implies that no political collective has moral standing, and therefore no unilateral 
acquisition/exercise of control over any such collective—say, of Sweden over Canada 
                                                                                                                                           
“collective agents” simpliciter and “morally good collective agents.” Cf. Applbaum’s definition of a 
“normative people,” in Applbaum, “Forcing a People to Be Free,” pp. 380, 389. 
33
 If the takeover involved violence and rights violations we would, of course, have other reasons for 
condemning it. 
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in the earlier example—is procedurally wrong. This conclusion arguably under-
ascribes wrongdoing, and at any rate is starkly at odds with Ypi’s claim that 
colonialism is always (i.e., non-contingently) procedurally wrong.  
Alternatively, we might think that the condition of “equality and reciprocity” 
is satisfied whenever a collective is appropriately attentive to the legitimate 
interests—not just the wills—of its members (and outsiders). 34  On this view, a 
political collective has moral standing as long as it is “reasonably just” towards 
individuals, procedurally as well as substantively. For present purposes, I do not 
commit to any particular view about reasonable justice; readers may just “plug in” 
their preferred account. Depending on how narrow or capacious the category of 
reasonable justice is, we will obtain different verdicts about the wrongness of 
unilateral takeovers.
35
 Relative to each criterion of reasonable justice, societies that 
meet it are on a par from a justice point of view. For instance, if, on our notion of 
reasonable justice, Canada qualifies as reasonably just, this version of a corporate 
account allows us to condemn Sweden’s imaginary takeover as procedurally 
wrongful.  
While in-principle capable of capturing the distinctive colonial wrongness of a 
hypothetical Swedish takeover of Canada, this modified version of Ypi’s view also 
                                                 
34
 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 37 
(1987): 127–50, p. 144. 
35
 To illustrate, again using Rawls’s theory of justice as a reference point, on a somewhat narrow 
understanding of “reasonable justice,” only societies that realize “justice as fairness” qualify as 
reasonably just. On a more capacious understanding, respect for basic liberties and equality of 
opportunity suffice for a society to qualify as reasonably just. Cf. Rawls’s idea of a “family” of 
reasonable liberal conceptions of justice, see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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allows for the possibility that “if a certain agent … denies equal and reciprocal voice 
to the claims of its members, it [can unilaterally, yet rightfully, be incorporated] into 
another one that respects the reciprocity criteria of political association.”36 In other 
words, it allows for circumstances under which colonialism is not distinctively 
procedurally wrong. 
In line with her claim that colonialism is always distinctively procedurally 
wrong, Ypi rejects this conclusion—and the corporate interpretation of her account 
leading to it—insisting that the unilateral takeover of a deeply unjust political 
collective on the part of a reasonably just one is also procedurally wrong (at least pro 
tanto). To reach this verdict, however, she switches back to an aggregate 
interpretation of the notion of a collective. In her words, “[i]f members of a group are 
denied representation within the [original, unjust] group, it is not clear that they 
should be unilaterally forced into another [more just] association, one whose terms are 
also initially imposed on them.”37 This brings us back to the difficulties considered in 
the previous section, which I do not restate here.  
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
Ypi’s claim that colonialism always instantiates a distinctive procedural wrong is 
intuitively appealing, but the foregoing discussion has put its tenability into question. 
In fact, the difficulties with Ypi’s view are serious enough to cast doubt on the very 
existence of a distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. Given those difficulties, 
we have good reason to believe that no such wrong exists. This conclusion may be 
reached via two different lines of argument, each stemming from a specific 
                                                 
36
 Ypi, “What’s Wrong with Colonialism,” p. 185. 
37
 Ibid., p. 185, emphasis added. 
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interpretation of what a commitment to normative individualism entails. In view of 
space constraints, I can only sketch each of them briefly, without offering a positive 
defence. The general conclusion that there exists no distinctive procedural wrong of 
colonialism, however, stands independently of which of the two lines of argument we 
take.  
Recall that, for normative individualists, the moral standing of collective 
agents is explained by, and conditional on, the impact that these agents have on the 
legitimate interests of individuals. Furthermore, since individuals’ interests are 
legitimate only if they are consistent with reasonable justice, from a normative 
individualist standpoint, a “justice-enhancing takeover” cannot be wrongful. That 
said, normative individualists may differ on whether a “justice-neutral” takeover—
i.e., one where the resulting political community is as reasonably just as in the status 
quo ante—can be wrongful.  
For some, namely those who see the moral standing of collectives as solely 
dependent on their conduciveness to reasonably just relations among individuals, it 
cannot. On this view, there are no resources to affirm the wrong involved in a 
peaceful and justice-neutral takeover of, say, Canada by Sweden. For how could the 
lack of consent on the part of the collective Canada be wrongful if (i) the standing of 
the collective Canada is reducible to its conduciveness to reasonably just relations 
among members and (ii) the Swedish government, by hypothesis, also establishes 
reasonably just relations among its newly acquired subjects?  
To be sure, we may still intuitively feel that such a takeover would be 
wrongful. But this feeling can be easily explained. Since real-world takeovers are 
likely to be predatorial and violent, adopting a blanket “no takeover” norm is the 
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better policy overall.
38
 And since our intuition is trained to respond to real-world 
cases, it delivers a false positive in unrealistic scenarios such as the one depicting a 
peaceful Swedish takeover of Canada.  
Once this becomes apparent, we are left with no reason to think that the 
takeover of a collective without its consent is ever wrong per se. What matters 
morally is the subjugation of individual human beings, their being denied equal status 
under the law, independently of the identity of the collective who makes and enforces 
the law. We should then conclude that what is wrong with colonialism, from a 
procedural perspective, is the same as what is wrong with regular domestic 
governments that fail to realize “relational” or “democratic” equality among their 
members.
39
 Colonialism is thus procedurally wrong, but not distinctively so. 
Though coherent, this first option will leave some readers dissatisfied. They 
will still feel uneasy about the moral pedigree of a hypothetical Swedish takeover of 
Canada—and this not merely because, were it to occur in the real world, it would be 
accompanied by much suffering and rights violations. The wrongness of the 
envisaged takeover seems to persist even if we take its philosophically “sanitized” 
description at face value.  
 This leads me to the second line of argument, which holds that collective 
agents may serve individuals’ legitimate interests in ways that go beyond the 
establishment of reasonably just relations among them. How exactly collectives might 
do this depends on our specific conception of individuals’ legitimate interests. 
Multiple possibilities are available. Here I sketch the two I find most promising.  
On one conception, recently defended by Anna Stilz, individuals have an 
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 I thank Cécile Fabre for suggesting this point. 
39
 Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics 109 (1999): 287–337. 
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interest in enjoying “maker freedom,” namely in seeing the institutions under which 
they live as their own creation, and affirming their participation in them.
40
 When this 
condition is met, individuals are not mere subjects to political power, but participants 
in a shared cooperative enterprise. When this condition is not met, individuals 
experience a destructive sense of alienation from their political institutions and 
broader social context. Provided the fulfillment of the interest in “maker freedom” is 
consistent with the establishment of reasonably just relations among the individuals 
involved, it is legitimate.
41
 On this view, unilaterally taking over a reasonably just 
political collective populated by individuals who affirm their political membership 
would thus be wrongful, insofar as it would set back their legitimate interest in 
“maker freedom.”  
 A different view could instead appeal to individuals’ interest in not being de 
facto disrespected. An action counts as “de facto disrespectful” when it falls under the 
purview of the notion of disrespect, as this is understood in the context in which the 
action is performed. Typically, actions that breach the positive norms characterizing a 
given context—i.e., actions that breach the permissions and prohibitions collectively 
accepted in that context
42—are de facto disrespectful in that context. For example, in 
Japan, there is a positive norm according to which “one ought not to tip, especially by 
                                                 
40
 Stilz, “The Value of Self-Determination.” 
41
 Stilz doesn’t use the language of “legitimate interests,” but she is explicit that, if affirmation of one’s 
membership in a political community is at odds with the satisfaction of (minimal) demands of justice, 
the latter should take priority. What Stilz calls “minimal justice” includes the protection of rights to 
subsistence, security, freedom of conscience, speech, association, and political opinion, but not of a 
right to full democratic participation. Her criterion, then, offers a somewhat permissive interpretation 
of what I call “reasonable justice.” See Stilz, “Decolonization and Self-Determination,” p. 22 (page 
proofs). 
42
 See, e.g., Nicholas Southwood and Lina Eriksson, “Norms and Conventions,” Philosophical 
Explorations 14 (2011): 195–217; Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas 
Southwood, Explaining Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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directly handing cash.” Breaching this norm, as tourist guides routinely point out, is 
de facto disrespectful. Similarly, in the U.K., there is a positive norm that mandates 
queuing, and skipping the queue in breach of this norm is de facto disrespectful. Or 
else, in Oxbridge colleges there typically exists a positive norm according to which 
“one ought to abide by the decisions of Governing Body,” and failing to abide by 
those decisions is de facto disrespectful. Provided the positive norms in question are 
consistent with reasonable justice, the corresponding interest in not being de facto 
disrespected they induce is legitimate. This is why it is wrong (at least pro tanto) to 
tip in Japan, to skip the queue in the U.K., and to ignore the decisions of Governing 
Body in an Oxbridge college.
43
 
Interestingly, the will of a political collective is itself constituted by a set of 
positive norms: those establishing the procedures—often enshrined in a constitution—
through which political decisions are taken. Since the acquisition of control over a 
reasonably just political collective without its consent breaches the positive norms 
that make up the collective’s will, on this view, it sets back the legitimate interest of 
its members in not being de facto disrespected, and is wrongful for that reason.  
 Crucially, on both the maker-freedom-based and respect-based versions of this 
second line of argument, the procedural wrong of unilateral takeovers is contingent on 
the target collectives’ meeting standards of reasonable justice. For, as we have seen, 
only once those standards are met, do individual members have a legitimate interest in 
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the collective’s will being honoured.44 This also means that while this second line of 
argument allows us to account for the wrongness of a hypothetical Swedish 
annexation of Canada (on the assumption that Canada is reasonably just), it cannot be 
used in support of the idea that there exists a procedural wrong distinctive of 
colonialism.  
Many colonized peoples probably did not meet standards of reasonable justice 
on any plausible normative individualist account of what reasonable justice 
demands.
45
 This, I should emphasize, is neither to depict colonized communities as 
“uncivilized,” nor to imply that their subjugators were somehow “morally superior.” 
The point I am making is modest, and hopefully uncontroversial: namely that, in all 
likelihood, many colonized communities were not reasonably just (at least not 
according to a normative individualist outlook on justice)—a claim that is equally true 
for their colonizers.  
In light of this, while offering a promising starting point for developing an 
account of the procedural wrong of “unilateral control over political collectives” in 
general, this second line of argument—in both the “maker-freedom” and “respect” 
versions—does not give us a characterization of the procedural wrong distinctive of 
colonialism in particular. Despite being deeply wrong for countless reasons—
including racism, violence, exploitation, murder, forced relocation, violations of 
relational equality between individuals and so forth—many real-world instances of 
colonization probably did not display the distinctive wrong in question.  
In conclusion, then, I remain sympathetic to the suggestion that the unilateral 
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 Stilz, in particular, regards the affirmation of one’s political membership as “authentic” only on 
condition that this occurs against a minimally just background. See Stilz, “Decolonization and Self-
Determination,” pp. 17, 22–23 (page proofs). 
45
 This is likely to be the case, to a significant extent, even when the “reasonable justice” condition is 
interpreted in Stilz’s somewhat minimalist terms (see note 41).   
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takeover of political collectives may—under appropriate circumstances—exhibit a 
distinctive procedural wrong. But I am sceptical about the existence of a distinctive 
procedural wrong of colonialism. Crucially, even if such a wrong does not exist, this 
does not preclude us from condemning colonialism for all the other well-known 
reasons. 
 
